Calling for Careful Designs for the Evaluation of Interactive Behavioral Measures on Early False-Belief Reasoning by Buttelmann, David
OPINION
published: 02 August 2017
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01302
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 August 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1302
Edited by:
Ilaria Grazzani,
University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy
Reviewed by:
Valerie Kuhlmeier,
Queen’s University, Canada
Renee Baillargeon,
University of Illinois at
Urbana–Champaign, United States
*Correspondence:
David Buttelmann
david.buttelmann@psy.unibe.ch
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Developmental Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 06 June 2017
Accepted: 17 July 2017
Published: 02 August 2017
Citation:
Buttelmann D (2017) Calling for
Careful Designs for the Evaluation of
Interactive Behavioral Measures on
Early False-Belief Reasoning.
Front. Psychol. 8:1302.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01302
Calling for Careful Designs for the
Evaluation of Interactive Behavioral
Measures on Early False-Belief
Reasoning
David Buttelmann*
Department of Developmental Psychology, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
Keywords: theory of mind, infancy research, implicit, interactive tasks, false belief
With the introduction of the interactive false-belief paradigm, Buttelmann et al. (2009) proposed
that already infants track another person’s beliefs in order to infer her or his goal and help
accordingly. This view has been challenged by Allen (2015) who argued that is not the
experimenter’s mental states but the social situation the test was embedded in that influenced
participants’ performance.
In Buttelmann et al.’s study, 16- and 18-month-old infants and 30-month-old toddlers watched
as an experimenter first opened and closed two empty boxes and then placed a toy in one of them.
He then either left (false-belief condition) or stayed and watched (true-belief condition) as an
assistant took the toy out of this box and placed it into the other box. The assistant then locked
both boxes, out of the experimenter’s sight (keeping him ignorant about the locking mechanism
in both conditions). At test, the experimenter tried to open the box he had placed the toy in
originally. Subsequently, the participants, who were knowledgeable about the locking mechanism,
were allowed to help the experimenter by opening one of the two boxes (or touching the locking
mechanism, at least). Buttelmann et al.’s rationale was that in the false-belief condition, participants
might reason that since the experimenter believed this box to contain his toy, he probably wanted
his toy. The appropriate help would thus be opening the other box (i.e., the one containing the toy).
In the true-belief condition, in contrast, since the experimenter knew this box to be empty (and his
toy being located in the other box), it was unlikely that he wanted the toy, so he seemingly wanted
to open this empty box. The appropriate help in this condition would thus be opening the empty
box. The authors found that children at all three ages chose the box with the toy significantly more
often in the false-belief than the true-belief condition. Separate analyses of the false-belief condition
further revealed that they chose this box significantly at above chance level.
Allen’s (2015) alternative explanation of the findings rests on the fact that in the false-belief
condition, the experimenter’s “false-belief was conflated with the playing of a trick” (p. 63). That
is, the assistant performed the switch of locations in a sneaky manner in the false-belief condition,
whereas no such deceptive element was present in the true-belief condition. In order to test this
alternative explanation, Allen first successfully replicated the result of the false-belief condition
with 3- to 5-year-old children and then ran two control conditions, the clairvoyance condition
and the hands-full condition. The clairvoyance condition was designed to test whether participants
indeed applied a mentalistic understanding in the false-belief condition. The procedure in this
condition was similar to that of the false-belief condition, with the crucial difference that at test the
experimenter tried to open the box that actually contained the object (i.e., the one she believed to be
empty). Allen’s rationale was that if children interpreted the experimenter’s action mentalistically,
they should reason that, since she believed this box to be empty, she wanted “an empty box” (p.
66, p. 69). The appropriate way to help might thus be to open the empty box (i.e., the one the
experimenter originally had put her object in). If, in contrast, the children opened the box with
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the object, this might suggest that the children were not basing
their helping response on the experimenter’s false belief. The
children’s performance in this condition did not differ from
that in the false-belief condition: they opened the box with the
toy. The hands-full condition was designed to directly investigate
the influence of the type of social situation on participants’
response. First, children were given a possible reason for why
the experimenter might want an empty box: they were told
that she wanted to store away toys (to hide them from a mean
agent). The experimenter filled the first box with toys and left.
In her absence, the assistant moved all the toys from this box
to the other box. However, the replacement of the toys was
not performed in a deceptive context. The experimenter then
returned with some toys and tried to open the box she believed
to be empty. Allen predicted that if children’s response was
driven by the broader social situation (i.e., the storing-away
context in this condition), children might open the empty box.
Results revealed that children as a group chose randomly between
the two boxes. This chance-level performance resulted from 3-
year-olds choosing the box with the toys, 4-year-olds choosing
randomly, and 5-year-olds choosing the empty box. The author
concluded that children’s performance in the current study and in
Buttelmann et al.’s study was based on the social situation rather
than the experimenter’s beliefs. In this article I attempt to clarify
why I think the interpretation of Allen’s results as challenging
Buttelmann et al.’s findings might be invalid.
Although, there is evidence that the type of social situation
a false-belief task is embedded in does influence preschoolers’
performance (for playful vs. predator/prey scenario see Keenan
and Ellis, 2003; for deceptive context see Wellman et al., 2001),
there is no evidence for such an effect in 2- or even 1-year-
olds. In contrast, at the time Allen’s study was submitted there
were already two studies published showing that 18-month-
olds pass interactive false-belief tests even if the task was not
embedded in a deceptive context (Knudsen and Liszkowski,
2012; Buttelmann et al., 2014; see also Buttelmann et al., 2015,
for a more recent one). Although, this does not rule out the
idea that the deceptive context in the Buttelmann et al. (2009)
study boosted participants’ performance, the hypothesis that such
a context is a necessary precondition for infants to pass an
interactive false-belief test has already been falsified.
Important theoretical and methodological differences
between conditions within Allen’s (2015) study make the
comparison of findings from these conditions difficult. For
example, while in the false-belief condition, the experimenter
tried to open the empty box, in the clairvoyance condition she
tried to open the box with the object (note that in Buttelmann
et al.’s study the experimenter tried to open the empty box
in both conditions). Thus, while in the false-belief condition
children needed to decide how to weigh the experimenter’s
pulling cue on one box and the object’s presence in the other box,
in the clairvoyance condition both of these cues were located at
the same box. In order to choose the empty box, participants
needed to inhibit both of these cues. This might have been too
demanding. Further, in contrast to the false-belief condition,
in the clairvoyance condition the experimenter behaved
inconsistently to her beliefs: although she believed the toy to
be in the first box, she tried to open the other one. Such belief-
inconsistent behavior seems to be quite challenging for children
to understand and is the basis for the violation-of-expectation
paradigm (e.g., Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005). There, children
tend to look longer at a scene in which an agent approaches a
container she believes to be empty (but does contain the object)
compared to a scene in which the agent approaches an empty
box she believes to contain the object (see Baillargeon et al., 2010,
for a review). Following this logic, children might have been
puzzled by the experimenter’s belief-inconsistent behavior in this
condition. Consequently, opening the box that combined both
cues of the situation (i.e., the experimenter’s pulling action and
the object being inside this box) might be the safest option for
participants, which is mirrored by the results.
Important theoretical and methodological differences
between Allen’s (2015) and Buttelmann et al.’s (2009) studies
make the use of Allen’s findings to interpret that of Buttelmann
et al. difficult. Firstly, Allen’s and Buttelmann et al.’s studies
differ dramatically in the age groups tested (Allen: 3- to 5-
year-olds; Buttelmann et al.: 16-, 18-, and 30-month-olds). In
my opinion, it seems absolutely possible that results for older
and younger children differ due to differences in motivation,
mobility, and experience. What might happen in older children
is, for example, that they take the assistant’s perspective (instead
of the experimenter’s) and keep on playing a trick on the
experimenter or they do not want to play a trick on the
experimenter (both participant behaviors reported by Allen).
Even though Allen replicated the false-belief condition with
3- to 5-year-olds (by using slightly different coding criteria
than Buttelmann et al.), it seems impossible to conclude that
infants and toddlers would perform as did preschoolers in
the clairvoyance and hands-full conditions. Secondly, Allen’s
assumption that both the clairvoyance condition and Buttelmann
et al.’s true-belief condition might be comparable is difficult given
the different rationales behind those conditions. In Buttelmann
and colleagues’ true-belief condition, the experimenter’s most
likely goal is opening the specific box he tried to open. In Allen’s
clairvoyance condition, the experimenter’s most likely goal is
“an empty box” (whatever box this might be, p. 66). These two
goals differ in their level of abstractness. It seems that children
do not draw the inference of “wanting an empty box” before
the age of 5, as demonstrated by the results in the hands-full
condition in Allen’s study. Thirdly, Allen’s hands-full condition -
designed as a control condition for Buttelmann et al.’s false-belief
condition - presented participants with a completely different
type of false-belief task: Buttelmann et al.’s task is an approach
false-belief task based on the original explicit change-of-location
task (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). That is, in the false-belief
condition the experimenter is looking for an object to have. The
logic of the hands-full condition follows that of an avoidance
false-belief task (Leslie et al., 2004). That is, the protagonist
desires to avoid the box with the toys (in order to find an empty
box for her toys). Children pass explicit avoidance false-belief
tasks at a significantly later age than explicit approach false-belief
tasks (e.g., see Cassidy, 1998; Leslie and Polizzi, 1998). The
finding that only the 5-year-olds succeeded in the hands-full
condition demonstrates that the demands in this condition were
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extremely high. Fourthly, whereas in Buttelmann et al.’s study
and Allen’s false-belief and clairvoyance conditions children
needed to infer the experimenter’s goal, they were explicitly told
the experimenter’s goal in the hands-full condition. Thus, it
seems thinkable that even without watching the whole procedure
children could have passed this condition. The finding that only
the 5-year-olds did suggests that it was difficult for (younger)
children to understand this goal or the physical circumstances
included in this condition.
Overall, the replication of Buttelmann et al.’s results in the
false-belief condition with an older age group is interesting.
However, Allen’s (2015) aim was to investigate whether or not
the social situation Buttelmann et al.’s (2009) task was embedded
in had an influence on participants’ performance. In my opinion,
Allen’s design does not allow to effect this purpose. I think the
clairvoyance condition reveals preschoolers’ difficulty to inhibit
choosing the box that was the only one being enhanced at test
(i.e., the one containing the object and being pulled) or that they
have problems generalizing goals (i.e., the experimenter wants
“an empty box”). The hands-full condition tells us something
about children’s difficulty and increasing ability to adjust their
helping behavior to a person’s observable need or explicit goal.
Given the reasons outlined above I conclude that these conditions
are not valid control conditions challenging the idea that infants
and toddlers applied belief reasoning in the original study. A
promising attempt to test the effect of the deceptive context on
infants’ performance in an interactive false-belief task might be to
run two almost identical conditions—one including a deceptive
element and one without such element—with infants from the
original age group. Such a control condition in combination
with others might allow valid conclusions about the degree to
which behavioral measures help transcend the infant false-belief
debate.
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